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Abstract 
Background: IoT and smart devices have become extremely popular in the last few 
years. With their capabilities to collect data, it is reasonable to have concerns about 
the protection of users’ personal information and privacy in general. Objectives: 
Comparing existing regulations on data protection and information security rules with 
the new capabilities provided by IoT and smart devices. Methods/approach: This 
paper will analyse information on data collected by IoT and smart devices and the 
corresponding legal framework to explore whether the legal framework also covers 
these new devices and their functionalities. Results: Various IoT and smart devices 
pose a high risk to an individual's privacy. The General Data Protection Regulation, 
although a relatively recent law, may not adequately regulate all instances and uses 
of this technology. Also, due to inadequate technological protection, abuse of such 
devices by unauthorized persons is possible and even likely. Conclusions: The number 
of IoT and smart devices is rapidly increasing. The number of IoT and smart home 
device security incidents is on the rise. The regulatory framework to ensure data 
controller and processor compliance needs to be improved in order to create a safer 
environment for new innovative IoT services and products without jeopardizing the 
rights and freedoms of data subjects. Also, it is important to increase awareness of 
homeowners about potential security threats when using IoT and smart devices and 
services.  
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A current buzzword in the field of information technology – IoT (Internet of Things) -is 
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research estimates predicted a 43% year on year growth of IoT connections 
(Bhattacharjya et al., 2018). Unfortunately, it is also increasingly connected with the 
rise of information security incidents and potential personal data breaches with 
significant impact on the privacy of individuals around the world (Lin et al. 2016). Legal 
science, especially in the field of data protection has only recently started to 
acknowledge the scope of the problem (Bu-Pasha, 2020; Edwards, 2016; Yang et al., 
2019).  
 Sometimes referred to as the internet of everything or industrial network, IoT is a 
broad term that encompasses various technologies. Most commonly it is understood 
as an adaptable technology allowing machines and devices to interact with each 
other over the Internet. It allows for remote control and access through existing 
network infrastructure, provide opportunities for more direct integration of the physical 
world into computer-based systems, and resulting in improved efficiency, accuracy 
and economic benefit in addition to reduced human intervention (Balamurugan et 
al., 2018). It however creates an increasingly complex environment to ensure the 
recognized fundamental rights such as privacy and data protection (Geneiatakis et 
al., 2017). While there is a particular research into the effect smart home and smart 
city development has had on the protection of rights and freedoms of individuals, 
there are many issues and aspects that need to be visited and considered when 
considering the mechanisms applicable from the current legal framework. The current 
state of legal science explores unequivocally legal issues of transborder transfer of 
data (Sullivan, 2019), trustworthiness of personal digital assistants (Furey & Blue, 2019), 
efforts in establishment of user centric privacy (Skarmeta et al., 2019) to ideological 
resistance to smart home platforms as strongholds of digital capitalism (Goulden, 
2019). Therefore, remarkably underlying the conflict between the struggling efforts of 
lawmakers and the indominable march of information technology development. With 
that in mind, the focus here is to analyse whether current provisions can be used to 
approach data protection and information security issues and serve as adequate 
compliance mechanisms. 
 The security threats posed by IoT devices have already been described in the 
literature (Jurcut et al., 2020). When we include more data collection capabilities 
enabled by smart meters (Iskraemeco, 2019) we come to a new situation that is not 
foreseen by the existing legal framework. Nor does the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR, European Commission 2016a), as a new regulation, and consumer 
protection regulations, adequately regulate these new areas of possible violations of 
personal privacy. In this paper, using technical knowledge and comparing it with the 
legal framework, our intention to show to what extent the legal framework can be 
applied, and where amendments are needed. We will use the provisions, and recitals 
of regulations that speak about the purpose of regulations. This explanation is 
important because targeted interpretation. Targeted or teleological interpretation or 
interpretation from the status of only one of the many methods of interpretation or 
interpretation came to the most important, decisive method (Kačer & Ivančić-Kačer, 
2019, p. 400). 
 IoT devices provide services to all kinds of applications through data gathering, 
identification, processing and communication capabilities. IoT connects infrastructure 
components and services for smart homes and offices, smart city infrastructure and is 
applicable in various fields of work – from general industry to real estate, healthcare, 
public safety. In principle, IoT generally allows for more interactive and efficient 
transportation and power utilities, etc. (Tzafestas, 2018). Developing IoT infrastructure 
can be expected to contain massive numbers of different sensors that collect, process 
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devices that are omnipresent in daily use such as personal computers, smartphones, 
television sets, game consoles and digital media reproduction devices.  
 Because of these characteristics, ΙοΤ is a technology of interest for modern hackers 
and cybercriminals. "While IoT deployments have been receiving much hype, their 
unique characteristics coupled with their interconnected nature indeed present new 
security challenges. Various technical difficulties, such as limited storage, power, and 
computational capabilities hinder addressing IoT security requirements, enabling a 
myriad of vulnerable IoT devices to reside in the Internet-space. Indeed, unnecessarily 
open ports, weak programming practices coupled with improper software update 
capabilities serve as entry points for attackers by allowing malicious re-programming 
of the devices, causing their malfunction and abuse" (Neshenko et al., 2020). Another 
point to consider is that the data that are generated around a single device may not 
be sensitive in itself. However, Iot networks usually consist of a large number of 
interconnected devices and when data is combined with data generated from other 
devices, it can reveal information such as the consumer habits, patterns of behaviour, 
and other data which may present significant risk for rights and freedoms of data 
subjects. New functionality brings new data security and privacy challenge, experts 
noticed that the weakest links of IoT can be driven by the low-cost devices with low 
security and cryptography technologies (Vongsingthong & Smanchat, 2015). 
Obviously, as IoT as a broad term encompasses many potential uses, it is not possible 
to cover all the issues and questions in the space available. In this paper we deal 
mostly with risks and challenges facing IoT smart home devices and not the IoT in 
industrial environment (smart containers and similar) in general, although it might not 
be possible to draw an exact line between such uses judging from the way these 
devices are incorporated into wide area networks. The General Data Protection 
Regulation has been in force only two years, from 25th May 2018. Meanwhile, the 
replacement of many measuring devices with smart meters has begun. Such smart 
meters that provide the utility provider with a significantly better insight into the life and 
habits of the user, require precise regulation. Users need to be aware of what kind of 
data is being collected on them. Furthermore, a large number of other smart and IoT 
devices do not have quality protection. Consumers need to be aware of this, which is 
not within the scope of the GDPR, but consumer protection regulations. In this paper, 
we would like to raise awareness of the need to apply and improve the legal 
framework. 
 Therefore, we prove why IoT devices represent a higher risk for personal data than 
previous monitoring technologies. After all, we put into perspective that technology 
and GDPR, including recitals, show us the purpose of Regulation. Since the GDPR 
includes information security requirements, and security is also important for devices 
that are not directly connected to service providers, we analyse the IoT and 
information security regulation with typical cases of IoT security breaches. As many 
metering devices do not collect user names directly (e.g. a three-tenant apartment), 
we analyse whether the data of such devices is still personal data. . Finally, concluding 
that the GDPR does not provide all the answers related to the safety, we also analyse 
the legal framework for consumer protection and make proposals for new regulations. 
 
IoT personal data processing as a source of risk  
While obviously far more efficient than previous monitoring devices, the IoT based 
devices equipped with sensors that can obtain personal data present a potentially 
considerable risk for personal data breaches and consequently rights and freedoms 
of data subjects. For example, electricity suppliers change the existing electricity 
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connected to the Internet and allow various levels of internet access, represent a 
significant fraction of total IoT devices currently in use. 
 In a corridor of a residential building, on a standard electricity meter, the 
consumption in the accounting period, and day/night consumption are stored locally. 
The data on consumption is available only to a person physically in front of the meter, 
and that person can usually see the actual current consumption per rotation speed. 
On the other hand, a question whether a person is currently present in the household 
and is using an electrical appliance can usually only be ascertained by directly 
observing the meter, in the SE Europe the meter is usually positioned in the corridor of 
the building. These appliances are now being replaced by smart meters running as IoT 
devices. 
 As a local example, let us consider the function of a typical meter such as the 
"Iskraemeco AM550" electricity meter which is extensively being installed with users in 
the Republic of Croatia (further: Croatia). The device offers several ways of 
communication that exclude a need for manual readings such as Full DLMS-COSEM 
and IEC 1107 compliance; four independent communication interfaces: Optical port, 
RJ11, for in-house display, M-bus, wired and wireless, WAN/NAN Communication 
modules – PLC G2/G3, and point-to-point 2G/3G/4G. The manufacturer itself states 
that specific user applications for "Smart Grid" features are new levels of ability to 
customize the meter (Iskraemeco, 2019). The device is capable of measuring much 
more than electricity consumption itself, it also provides two-way ‘’energy’’ 
measurements, active energy and power, 4Q reactive energy & power, apparent 
energy & power, instantaneous value of voltage, current, power factor, frequency 
and power and an absolute measurement of active energy & power (Iskraemeco, 
2019).  
 This device has been singled out as an example due to the fact it has been installed 
in many households in Croatia and the region, however there are many similar devices 
that can be found in the market elsewhere. It is obvious that a device that has so far 
only measured the power consumption has been replaced by a much more capable 
one, one that now also measures several other values that can directly or indirectly 
be used to follow and profile the user behaviour through time, presenting a potential 
new risk for the data subjects. 
 Another example can a be smart water meter. One of these products readily 
available in the European market is "Apator smart +" class of water meter. For this 
example, we can use S SMART+ - VANE-WHEEL SINGLE-JET DRY WATER METERS (DN15-
20). It is described thus: " For measuring the flow and volume of water with a 
temperature up to 30 °C or 50 °C, or warm water with a temperature up to 90 °C in 
the closed-circuit system with the full flow of the flux, and on the maximum working 
pressure up to 16 bar (PN16)." Features of device include: " Pre equipped for installation 
of radio module for communication in the Wireless M-Bus, impulse module and M-Bus 
module" (APATOR, 2019). 
 If that module is installed reading the collected data is quite simple: "Wireless M-bus 
is a complete solution for wireless reading of various scales. Communication takes 
place at 868 MHz according to the wireless M-bus protocol (standard EN 13757-4: 
2005). The ‘’Walk-By-Read mode’’ uses a handheld reader or a laptop equipped with 
a Bluetooth converter. In most cases, we perform the drive-by reading, meaning that 
our smart car equipped with antennas and a Bluetooth converter can come in front 
of the building and all internal water meters are read automatically and when we 
enter the shaft to read the main water meter, we immediately know if there is any 






Business Systems Research | Vol. 11 No. 3 |2020 
 Communication standard is widespread and documented: BS EN 13757-4:2005 
Communication systems for meters and remote reading of meters. Wireless meter 
readout (radio meter reading for operation in the 868-870 MHz SRD band). Water 
meter does not collect an extensive data set like electricity meter, but one who has 
access and collects data daily or every few days can collect sensitive data, for 
example when households is empty. Experts agree that using Internet of Things 
technologies leave many of the safety concerns ultimately with and in the hands of 
the consumer. (Tzafestas, 2018).  
 Should an unauthorized and potentially malicious user obtain access to the data 
of the electricity meter, there could be unintended but potentially very serious 
consequences for the data subject. For example, if data on power consumption 
could be established, with knowledge of the energy and consumption of individual 
devices, the malicious users could easily obtain real time and historical data about 
data subjects habits and behaviour such as when the resident comes home from work 
or other functions, which is the optimal room temperature preferred or even when 
energy intensive appliances such as ovens or vacuum cleaners are being used 
indicating activity or habits. Additionally, it could be ascertained when the 
occupant/data subject is showering, whether there is more than one person in the 
apartment, when and how long they watch television or spend time in various places 
in the household. What once was a simple record of electricity consumption now is 
representing a detailed record of personal life and habits.  
 Speaking from the legal perspective, the current situation with the lack of security 
of connected products has been somewhat helped by the fact that manufacturers 
have not been held responsible with respect minimum information security levels of 
their product. Since the consumer awareness is still low, there have not yet been 
enough cases to establish the clear frame of their liability. Since there is no regulatory 
nor economic incentive, the market fails to provide appropriate measures. (Opinion 
Consumers and IoT security, 2019). This makes the devices extremely vulnerable, when 
there is no obligation to install updates or apply similar measures, even middle skilled 
hacker can jeopardize device. 
  IoT devices can also be misuse for DDoS attacks. "Consumer products that fall in the 
IoT category are connected products. Their connectivity will typically be to a service 
accessible over wide-range (e.g. Internet) protocols and optionally to a smartphone 
application accessible over short-range protocols (e.g. Bluetooth, WLAN, etc.). In 
scenarios where IoT products are compromised and used in a distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attack, it is the former type of connection that is exploited by malicious 
actors" (Opinion Consumers and IoT security, 2019). 
 
IoT and General Data Protection Regulation 
While the new European general framework of data protection, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), does not specifically mention IoT devices, nor do the 
national application laws such as the Croatian General Data Protection Regulation 
Application Act, it does feature a number of recitals and provisions applicable to data 
collection through smart home devices and IoT. 
 In preamble, the Regulation in Recital 6 of the GDPR acknowledges that: “Rapid 
technological developments and globalization have brought new challenges for the 
protection of personal data. The scale of the collection and sharing of personal data 
has increased significantly. Technology allows both private companies and public 
authorities to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale in order to 
pursue their activities. Natural persons increasingly make personal information 
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social life and should further facilitate the free flow of personal data within the Union 
and the transfer to third countries and international organizations, while ensuring a 
high level of protection of personal data” (European Commission, 2016b).  
The legislative response to these developments from the perspective of data 
protection, apart from the General Data Protection Regulation and associated 
Directives and Regulations such as the Directive 2016/680 and the Directive 2016/680 
and the Regulation 2018/1725, has been mostly through the national implementations 
acts dealing with the position and competences of independent national supervisory 
bodies and regulating the issues left by the GDPR to the national legal systems, as well 
as updating national laws to comply with data protection principles set forth by the 
Regulation. 
 According to a study by the Global Privacy Enforcement Network in 2016, most of 
the connected devices fail to adequately explain to customers how their personal 
data is processed which is now a direct violations of the transparency principle and 
applicable provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation. Failure to inform 
data subjects on the details of processing is perhaps not surprising given the extent to 
which IoT services involve significantly more parties than traditional services, for 
example, sensor manufacturers, hardware manufacturers, IoT operating systems 
vendors, IoT software vendors, mobile operators, device manufacturers, third party 
app developers, however it does represent a significant breach of data subjects 
rights.(Borelli et al., 2015). 
 Naturally, IoT products and services allow for collecting large amounts of data, 
some of which may be of potentially of sensitive nature. As far as the idea of a device 
that communicates with people or generally exchanges information with the 
environment in order to facilitate certain tasks, e.g., a washing machine that 
automatically orders detergents is a concern. It is obvious that certain safeguards 
need to be undertaken as not to jeopardize the privacy of the users. The Regulation 
mandates that the service provider ensures the safety and security of processing. 
 The Regulation takes this further in Recital 39 elaborating on the principles of data 
protection, especially the principles of purpose limitation, storage limitation and data 
minimization: “Natural persons should be made aware of risks, rules, safeguards and 
rights in relation to the processing of personal data and how to exercise their rights in 
relation to such processing. In particular, the specific purposes for which personal data 
are processed should be explicit and legitimate and determined at the time of the 
collection of the personal data. The personal data should be adequate, relevant and 
limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed. This 
requires, in particular, ensuring that the period for which the personal data are stored 
is limited to a strict minimum. Personal data should be processed only if the purpose 
of the processing could not reasonably be fulfilled by other means. In order to ensure 
that the personal data are not kept longer than necessary, time limits should be 
established by the controller for erasure or for a periodic review.” 
 The volume of data that IoT products and services collect can contain personal 
and sensitive data interesting to a wide array of third parties ranging from financial 
institutions such as banks and insurance companies, to communications and 
entertainment service providers as well as market researchers etc.  
 The integration of home and IoT brings new forms of risks, and residents’ perception 
on these new risks is quite important for the development of smart home technologies. 
IoT devices use wide array of sensors that collect and process staggering amounts of 
data. A number of authors have recognized several key points regarding the 
application of the GDPR to IoT processing, mostly focusing on issues regarding 
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of consent which is unsuited to many IoT situations), struggle of IoT service operators 
with data protection principles enshrined by the Regulation such as principles of 
transparent, fair and legal processing, data minimisation and data security – 
confidentiality and integrity (Bastos et al., 2018).  
These authors correctly suggest that data breach reporting provisions may present, 
at least at this point in development, a challenging requisite for IoT service and 
product providers as both identifying risk and determining consequences of a data 
breach in IoT environment that may number thousands or hundreds of thousands of 
distinct devices that may work largely independently or predominantly collaborate in 
a network which is a potentially daunting exercise with no clear cut forensic protocols 
or assessment schemes.  
Another interesting point these authors raise, on which we agree is the requirement 
of data protection by design and by default as stipulated by the Article 25 of the 
GDPR. Taking into account the conditions set forth by the GDPR may not be an easy 
task in development of new innovative IoT devices and services. Cost of 
implementation of appropriate measures may be prohibitively high considering the 
relatively simple nature of sensors and monitoring devices that limit the ability of 
manufacturers to effectively implement efficient technical and organisational 
measures to help comply with GDPR requirements.  
Similar observations were made previously by other authors, notably Wachter who 
conducted a systematic analysis of available literature in 2018 and identified a 
number of key issues, some going back to papers published years before GDPR which 
was adopted in 2016, especially including security and consent. To previously outlined 
GDPR requirements, Wachter also adds provisions regarding certain data subjects' 
rights, general security requirements for data controllers and data protection impact 
assessment provisions (Wachter 2018a).  
 Most IoT devices have a physical aspect that demands ensuring the physical safety 
regarding the device as well as the user and the environment that the device is 
deployed in. This integration between cyber-security and physical safety raises the 
need for a new approach to these problems and development of sufficient security 
controls (Columbus, 2018). Smart household appliances such as electricity meters, 
toasters, TVs, refrigerators, and other smart household appliances can also cause 
some major issues as they gather a wealth of data and life habits of natural persons 
living in these households (e.g. the exchange of data between home appliances).  
 On average, current research shows that the regular smart home ecosystem is one 
comprised of about 20 smart devices, including the household gateway or router 
(Pascu, 2018).  
 Also, this may represent potential threat in the event of exploitation of such data, 
given that these are personal data of natural persons through which third parties can 
monitor and use their habits.  
 In 2014, the European Commission issued a recommendation regarding the 
preparations for the roll-out of smart metering strategies (European Commission 
(2014)). In this Recommendation, data protection and security considerations are 
outlined. It's also quite ironic that mobile phones act as a tracking device so hackers 
can use their      location information to steal data, hurt or at least find out natural 
persons daily routines and behaviour patterns.  
 With respect to IoT in context of smart homes, data protection laws demand several 
considerations mandated by the General Data Protection Regulation and potentially 
expanded on by national application laws such as privacy by design and by default, 
adequate analysis and treatment of risks to rights and freedoms of data subjects, 
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properly evaluated legal basis (especially concerning potential for widespread 
unlawful secondary use of collected data). 
 Users who enthusiastically accept IoT or those that are compelled to do so, i.e. 
through obligatory replacement of electricity meters are usually not aware of the 
extent of the processing – the type, nature and volume of personal data collected, 
let alone their potential (mis)use. The Regulation now mandates that data controllers 
inform data subjects on the purpose, volume and scope of their processing. 
 The data controllers, and by extension their data processors offering Internet of 
things devices and services are required, starting with the Article 5 of the GDPR, to 
behave in an accountable way towards personal data, processing the data in 
accordance with the principles and compliance mechanisms put forth by the 
Regulation. 
 Through registration process and information channels offered to their users, data 
subjects using such devices and services should be notified about the nature, volume 
and scope of personal data processing.  
 The controllers should adopt proper technical and organizational protection 
measures, assert the level of risk to the rights and freedoms of their data subjects and 
regulate their relations with data processors as regulated by the Article 28 of the 
Regulation.  
 Needless to say, controllers should carefully examine the processing operations 
conducted by their devices and services, establish proper and applicable basis for 
personal data processing and rely on contractual and consent basis according to 
standards regulated by the new legal framework as well as existing practice as put 
forth by the Article 29 Working Party and the European Data Protection Board 
guidance documents, national supervisory body guidance and opinions and 
established legal practice. 
 Data controllers responsible for IoT infrastructure will need to develop ways to let 
users exercise their data protection rights. Some of those rights, such as the right of 
data portability are there to prevent unwanted user lock-ins often observable in 
different IT industry fields. There is also a question of user control over collection and 
processing of data. As before, principles of personal data processing and now firmly 
recognized and established rights of data subjects and their firm enforcement should 
help mitigate the feeling of the loss of user control and foster a safer environment for 
further development of these technologies. 
 The level of control that data subjects enjoy over their data is largely dependent 
on how well the manufacturers of IoT based equipment and products manage to 
inform their customers about the nature and purpose of data their devices collect. 
This includes both what the data collected is used for and what the likely 
consequences for the users are (Open Rights Group, 2019). This is the reason why it is 
necessary to make amendments to the Regulation at Member States level, according 
to which manufacturers must inform consumers with the installation of new IoT devices 
in their households on which data can be collected by the particular device. 
 
IoT and information security regulations 
As the structure and organization of the Internet does not take into account the 
borders between nations and other established parameters of competence, the 
problems concerning the availability and regular service of Internet service providers 
may have an obstructive effect on one of the Member States or the EU as a whole. 
Safety and security of network and information systems and the personal data 
processing that underlines so much of the current Internet economy is the key for 
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safety as more and more communal infrastructure services rely on networked 
technology for more efficient and smarter function. 
 As the EU lawmakers adopted the Network and Information Security Directive, its 
main objective was to raise the level of Member State cooperation in establishing and 
maintaining a high level of network and information security throughout the EU 
(European Commission, 2016b).  
 Establishing cooperation bodies, defining responsibilities and designating contact 
institutions in Member States, and adopting national information and network security 
strategies was a required formal step in this effort, however the regulation of 
information security obligations for providers in Member States was required by 
transposing the Directive into national legal systems by 2018. In reality, this process took 
a while longer but was finally completed in early 2020 with 13 Member States adopting 
a single national law as the transposition measure and 15 Member States adopting or 
updating two or more national laws which most of the Member States achieved 
through one or more national transposition measures. 
 In the case of Croatia, the transposition of the NIS Directive was carried out through 
provisions of the Act on Cyber Security of Essential Service Operators and the Digital 
Services Providers – The Cyber Security Act of key service providers and digital service 
providers (Hrvatski Sabor, 2018a). It contains the relevant definitions of key terms and 
concepts (Article 5), applicable criteria for appointing essential service operators and 
digital service providers (Articles 6-13, Annex I&II), as well as establishing obligations for 
these service providers in order to maintain adequate level of cybersecurity (Articles 
14 through 24). 
 While the essential service providers are recognized and designated directly by the 
Act on the basis of NIS Directive Criteria and the comparative practice and 
experiences of other Member States, the recognition and designation of digital 
services providers is subject to a procedure. This procedure includes, alongside of 
criteria as regulated by the Cyber Security Act, designation by the competent body, 
in this case the Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship and Crafts (Hrvatski Sabor, 
2018a, Articles 1-3).  
 Foreseeable use of IoT in offering certain essential services such as power and water 
distribution, as well as proliferation of smart home devices will trigger recognition and 
designation of controllers of these services as essential or digital service providers. 
These controllers are now obliged to implement technical and organizational 
measures to effectively manage risks as well as measures to prevent and mitigate 
effects of information security incidents on the security and safety of information 
systems (Hrvatski Sabor, 2018a, Article 14). 
 In particular, essential services operators need to implement such technical and 
organizational measures to effectively ascertain the incident risk, prevent, discover 
and solve information security incidents and mitigate incident effect to the lowest 
possible impact level (Hrvatski Sabor, 2018a, Article 15). 
 In turn, digital services providers when implementing required technical and 
organizational measures need to ensure safety of systems and installations, incident 
discovery and solving, maintain service continuity, adequately monitor, audit and test 
implemented measures and follow recognized information security standards in 
information security (Hrvatski Sabor, 2018a, Article 16). 
 The provisions of the Cyber Security Act of 2018 were operationalized in the 
provisions of the national Regulation on Cyber Security of Essential Service Operators 
and Digital Service Providers which was also enacted in 2018 (Hrvatski Sabor, 2018c). 
As there is no case law to examine following the start of application of the new 
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While the measures contained in these provisions represent an organisational and 
financial burden for the service providers, they do prima facie lead to higher degree 
of security and the Regulation demands that essential service operators create and 
manage an information security policy that needs to define goals and guidelines how 
to preserve the continuity of function of key systems, assess and manage risks, describe 
the system of information security management including the auditing of 
implementation of cybersecurity measures, provide key operational security 
procedures and include organisation and implementation of educational and 
awareness raising efforts. The Regulation further regulates the obligation of identified 
essential service providers to ensure physical security of the key systems, to ensure the 
availability of equipment required for continuing function and maintenance of 
essential systems etc. The essential service providers are required to manage 
contractual relations with external service providers that may affect the key systems, 
including assessing risks before contracting outsourced services and products. 
Essential service providers are also mandated to control access to essential system 
premises, log and note access to essential systems, implement antimalware and anti-
denial-of-service (anti-DOS) controls as well as manage development, research and 
continuity of operation of essential services. The operators are required by the 
Regulation to conduct vulnerability assessments, and in cases of serious security 
incidents to notify competent authorities designated by the Cyber Security Act. 
 
Example cases of IoT security breaches 
Practical use of IoT is already riddled with numerous incidents and disclosed or 
discovered vulnerabilities that may reveal the incident threat level and risk for users’ 
rights and freedoms. Some of them were reported on by mainstream news or 
technology magazine, such as the case of SAM Seamless Network in 2019 (Narendra, 
2019)  
 Smart home appliances offer new venues for attack. An attacker can hack into the 
smart home system and unlock the front door, open windows or turn on appliances 
causing damage to the home of the victim. These new type of smart home attacks 
result in new forms of risks for the residents (Denning et al., 2013). Cameras (security 
cameras of baby monitor) can be hacked and used for illegal access or join into a 
zombie network with the purpose to commit a distributed denial of service attack 
(Wallace, 2018). Garage doors collect data on when you usually arrive home from 
work, giving tech-savvy thieves information they need to plan a break in. There are 
many similar examples, and new devices and uses are connected into smart home 
platforms practically on everyday basis. 
 The fast growth and proliferation of devices and associated risks would benefit from 
a systematic overview and classification. One such classification groups risks into the 
five categories (Apiumhub, 2018):  
1. Risk to personal data and privacy: The Internet of Things presents a higher risk 
to personal data processing.  
2. Technical vulnerabilities in authentication: As IoT devices are connected 
through the network, they usually employ some sort of cloud interface. Its 
vulnerability may lead to compromise of data subject security. 
3. Human factor: As IoT is a relatively new technology, the staff at companies 
offering these services and products are relatively uninformed which hightens 
the risks to information systems and data subject personal data 
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 Risks of having an increasingly complex information system: the more devices, 
people, interactions and interfaces, the more the risk for data security also increases. 
It means that there is more variety and diversity in the system, so the challenge of 
managing all points in the network to maximize security also increases. Some of the 
worst case scenarios of IoT attacks that have so far been noted by security researchers 
include content streaming platform attacks, massive malware distribution attempts, 
hacking of increasingly connected smart vehicles as well as medical devices: 
1. In October 2016, the largest DDoS attack ever occurred on service provider 
Dyn using an IoT botnet, followed by the crash and unavailability of large 
sections of the Internet, including Twitter, Guardian, Netflix, Reddit and CNN. 
This IoT botnet was enabled by malicious software called Mirai. Once infected 
with Mirai, computers constantly searched the Internet for vulnerable IoT 
devices, and then used known default usernames and login passwords, 
contaminating them with malware. Among the devices that were attacked 
were digital cameras and DVR players. 
2. In 2017, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) confirmed that certain 
medical devices had vulnerabilities that could allow hackers to access the 
devices such as pacemakers and defibrillators used to monitor and control 
patients' heart functions and prevent heart attacks. Because of the vulnerability 
of the transmitter, hackers could control the shocks, manage the incorrect 
pacing, and drain the battery. 
a) 3. An IBM affiliated security research website reported a possibility of an attack 
targeting an Internet connected vehicle. A team of researchers was able to 
take total control of a Jeep SUV using the vehicle’s CAN bus (Dunlap, 2017). 
The Jeep computer needed a firmware update, and it used the Sprint mobile 
network, and a team of experts realized they could make the car behave the 
way they wanted: make it run off the road, slow down and speed up potentially 
endangering the occupants of the vehicle or bystanders. We can conclude 
that IoT affects personal data and generally information about people's’ habits 
and their movement, in two (2) ways: 
a) As smart devices are technologically supported by IoT, they collect 
much more data than "dummy" devices, 
b) IoT devices, on the contrary, are much more vulnerable to hacking or 
other forms of abuse than classical devices. 
 These mentioned issues make security issues far more complicated, both legal and 
technological. Huawei forecasts 100 billion IoT connections by 2025, and McKinsey 
Global Institute suggests that the financial impact of IoT on the global economy may 
be as much as $3.9 to $11.1 trillion by 2025 (James, 2015).  
Smart devices obviously have benefits for both consumers and businesses. In 2017 
alone, the market for these devices brought in $ 84 billion, almost 16% more than in 
2016, according to a report by Ablondi (2018). By 2023, 274M homes worldwide, or 14% 
of all households, will have at least one type of smart system installed (Strategy 
Analytics, 2018). 
 While there are various ways to protect consumers from the IoT security threats – 
education about information security basics as an integral part of digital literacy, 
changing default privacy and security settings and managing personal access codes 
etc. - some age long accepted practices still apply in the digital domain. When 
buying an IoT device or home appliance it is important to know that buying a reliable 
device from a reputable supplier means greater chance of the supplier satisfying EU 
data protection and information security regulations such as naming representatives 
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protection impact assessments and other compliance activities for their products and 
the companies themselves, have invested into information security standard 
certification and have a history of understanding the modern regulatory framework in 
contrast to cheap products from mostly unknown suppliers available only through 
wholesale Internet commerce sites. 
 Safety wise smart home device suppliers and platforms operators should create 
vulnerability management program. Such program should identify and fix device 
weaknesses that can emerge over time – a common reason would be the use of 
outdated operating systems or antivirus software for personal use. “Users’ right to data 
protection and right to privacy must be balanced in the design and governance of 
identification technologies in the IoT” (Wachter, 2018b). 
 Therefore, the appropriate measures must be taken to make smart homes safer and 
more suitable for life. It is also necessary to carry out a careful assessment of safety 
risks, which must be preceded by security implementation to ensure that all underlying 




Is IoT Data necessarily a Personal Data? 
IoT devices obviously create interesting new legal and policy challenges that 
lawmakers have not encountered before. At the same time, IoT technologies add to 
many issues that already exist and manifest in data protection practice (Rose et al., 
2015). Utility companies and other similar service providers may claim that the data 
they collect on IoT devices is not personal data, that is, they do not fall within the scope 
of GDPR. It is also clear why - the theses we cite in this article state that sensitive 
personal data may be involved, and the storage and processing of such data must 
be conducted in accordance with the rules imposed by Regulation. It is not only a 
matter of formally defining information as personal, but also a matter of security. Art. 
32 of the Regulation has the following on the issue of data controller obligations 
concerning Security of processing: " Taking into account the state -of -the -art, the 
costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing 
as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate 
technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the 
risk, including inter alia as appropriate: (a) the pseudonymisation and encryption of 
personal data; (b) the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and resilience of processing systems and services; (c) the ability to restore 
the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a 
physical or technical incident; (d) a process for regularly testing, assessing and 
evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for ensuring 
the security of the processing.” 
 Based on the evaluation of the established ECJ and national supervisory body 
practice and applicable WP29 and EDPB guidelines, data collected by IoT may 
indeed represent personal data if it relates to an identified or identifiable natural 
person, and in some cases it may even reveal sensitive data such as data relating 
to health, biometric data and data related to aspects of data subject behaviour..  
 The easiest way to avoid the extra cost coming from obligations to ensure safe and 
secure processing of such data is to deny that data in question are personal 
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information is what is indeed at stake. Such an issue is important not only for IoT meters 
but also for other IoT devices which collect data on the activities of natural persons. 
 GDPR Art. 4. defines: "‘personal data’ meaning any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person; ‘data subject’; an identifiable natural person 
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person". 
 Following the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights protection of personal data in the EU has been defined as a 
fundamental right separate from the right to privacy. GDPR, Preamble 1 also states 
that "The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is 
a fundamental right. Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (the ‘Charter’) and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) provide that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her." Also, Preamble 39 quotes: "Any processing of personal data 
should be lawful and fair." 
 The question of what belongs to personal data has already been extensively 
analysed in legal literature and the judicature of ECJ (i.e. regarding the dynamic ip 
addresses in the Case C-582/14: Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland). One of 
the earliest examples is the one published by the UK’s Information Commissioner's 
Office (ICO), analysing the provisions of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). ICO’s 
document “Determining what is Personal Data” states: "It is important to remember 
that it is not always necessary to consider ‘biographical significance’ to determine 
whether data is personal data." 
This document also cites an example of a case of collecting water measurement 
data: "A utility company may not record the name of the occupier of the house to 
which it provides water, but may simply note the address of the property and address 
all bills to 'the occupier’. Data concerning the water consumption for a particular 
address will be personal data about the occupier where this data determines what 
that individual will be charged for. In this last example, even without a name 
associated with the water consumption data, this data will be personal data in that it 
determines what the occupier will be charged and the occupier is identified, even 
without a name, as the person living at the property in question and is therefore 
distinguished from other individuals. Also, if necessary, the water company is likely to 
be able to easily obtain the name of, if not the occupier, then at least the registered 
owner of the property" (Determining what is personal data, 2012). 
 In countries where utility bills typically come labelled with a user’s name, this data 
represents personal data. Further let’s consider that the scope of personal data in 
practical, if not legal sense, is wider today than it was twenty years ago and on the 
basis of which these examples are cited. Recent literature supports this view: "It should 
be noted that personal data can relate to more than one person. For example, the 
location of a person at any particular time may also constitute the personal data of 
other known individuals in the same location. Joint property ownership can amount to 
the personal data of two persons. The content of an email sent by a tenant living in 
an apartment block complaining about his neighbour may contain information 
relating to both the complainer and the person about whom the complaint was 
made. A page of text recording a discussion between two individuals, perhaps 
including a detailed exchange of views or a disagreement, may be the personal data 
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 Utility providers, telecoms, and other companies can relatively easily collect 
information about individuals residing in a residential facility, e.g. apartments or 
houses; consumption bills are tied to the name of the natural person; telecoms 
additionally offer various benefits of "family packages" to gain an accurate family 
image), and therefore we can conclude that the data that can be traced on the 
habits of householders and guests using IoT devices, whether metric or otherwise are 
undoubtedly personal information, even when they are not individualized, e.g., data 
on the electricity consumption of an apartment where two people reside. 
 Comparison of different categories of such data may pose a particular privacy risk, 
e.g. a utility company in a local government unit may collect data from different 
measuring devices as well as from other sources, e.g., local video surveillance of 
parking lots. A negligent or malicious operator comparing such information could get 
a very accurate and sensitive image of one's movements and habits, and deeply 
invade a person's privacy.  
IoT and customer protection rules 
The European Consumer Protection Framework does not regulate IoT and smart 
devices in terms of informing IoT device users of the ability to collect data by such 
devices. This is understandable because the legal framework is outdated (Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council). National 
regulations, such as the Croatan Customer Protection Act provides only a brief 
reference in the need to comply with data protection regulations (Hrvatski Sabor, 
2018b). 
 The new proposed legal framework partly addresses the issue of data collection 
through the introduction of new digital services (EU to modernize Act on Consumer 
Protection). Thus, it is proposed that: "In respect of personal data of the consumer, the 
trader shall comply with the obligations applicable under Regulation (EU) 2016/679." 
Also interesting is the following provision regarding the provision regarding the use of 
personal data by the trader, considering the obligations of the trader in the event of 
termination(Council of the European Union, 2019). 
 However, there is no obligation on the trader to explicitly inform the user about the 
ability to collect data from an individual smart device, e.g., electricity meter. This is in 
stark contrast with the provisions of the GDPR, from the basic principles of processing 
to the right of data subjects to be informed and to access their data. Here, we 
mention the Croatian practice - the dummy meter is being replaced by a smart 
device, where the user only signs a record of the change of the meter, but is not 
familiar with the new possibilities of collecting data on the changed device, except in 
the case of self-information. 
 
Conclusion 
The focus of this paper was to present the applicable data protection and information 
security regulative context to the rise of Internet-of-Things data processing paradigm, 
also to outline the activities that data controllers and processors should undertake to 
mitigate possible data breaches. Even though personal data protection has been 
recognized as a fundamental right of individuals in the EU for almost two decades, 
and after almost the same development period, now there is an established 
information security regulatory framework with obligations for essential service 
operators and digital service providers. There is still much effort required to increase 
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threats that may be possible when using these devices and services. IoT rapidly 
occupies the global market which brings unprecedented benefits mostly from 
improved efficiency, accuracy and economic benefits. It changed the world of wi-fi 
connected devices; thus, they are becoming more interconnected in a smart grid 
and can easily reduce human intervention which was the idea from the beginning of 
development. 
 Our research has confirmed that users should be protected and acquainted with 
the smart devices implemented into their households according to the GDPR, bearing 
in mind that utility service install smart devices into their households priorly without 
letting users know what type of device is being installed, and without their proper 
consent. Future research should analyse developing comparative law and discuss 
best practices, especially on the level of EU Member States. The new laws and 
regulations transposing the NIS Directive and accompanying the GDPR present an 
opportunity to improve regulatory framework to ensure data controller and processor 
compliance and create a safer environment for new innovative IoT services and 
products without jeopardizing the rights and freedoms of data subjects.  
The paper predicts and gives examples of practical implications showing that this can 
sometimes be detrimental to utility users because they are not aware of their rights, 
and thus do not even recognize potential security threats that cannot be ruled out. In 
the end, however, the complexity of smart home infrastructure may very well prove 
impossible to apply standard information security solutions to smart devices such as 
smart TVs, connected home appliances or connected energy sensors and water 
distribution services. Therefore, integrated security approach, risk identification, risk 
management and ultimately accountable behaviour of data controllers and other 
service providers is of foremost importance.  
 In this paper we explained how such devices bring numerous savings nevertheless 
on the other hand IoT brings unsuspected risks in the area of personal data protection 
and security of infrastructure. As number of IoT and smart home device security 
incidents continues to rise, it is going to be quite difficult to ensure safe and secure 
processing of user data without empowering users themselves through active 
decision-making about the security status of their own IoT home network. 
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